China’s Infiltration of the Canadian Government and the Dangerous Precedent of Foreigners in the Military
Page 2 of 2
Implications for North American Security
The implications of this policy extend beyond Canada’s borders, setting a perilous precedent for North American security. Canada and the United States share an integrated defense framework through NORAD and NATO, relying on seamless coordination to protect the continent. Any compromise within the CAF could undermine this partnership, providing adversaries with insights into joint operations, Arctic defense strategies, and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. China’s growing interest in the Arctic—where it has deployed surveillance buoys and sought to expand its presence—only heightens the stakes.
Moreover, the absence of robust vetting mechanisms and unchecked immigration with criminals and terrorists pouring into Canada exacerbates the risk. While the CAF has pledged to enhance background checks, the complexity of screening foreign nationals with ties to adversarial states poses a formidable challenge and Canada has proven a failed record when it comes to security checks. China’s use of proxies and coercion within diaspora communities could obscure an individual’s true loyalties, making it difficult to detect planted agents. The precedent this sets could also pressure the U.S. to consider similar measures, further weakening North America’s collective security posture at a time of escalating global tensions.
A Call for Reconsideration
Critics argue that Canada’s decision reflects a troubling naivety about the evolving nature of geopolitical threats. Rather than addressing the root causes of military recruitment challenges—such as improving domestic incentives or countering foreign disinformation targeting youth—the government has opted for an expedient fix with long-term consequences. This move contrasts sharply with the U.S., which tightened restrictions on foreign research and military cooperation after recognizing China’s exploitation of open systems.
To safeguard its sovereignty and North American security, Canada must reconsider this policy. Strengthening counterintelligence efforts, implementing a foreign agent registry, and enhancing diplomatic pushback against interference should take precedence over opening the military to untested risks. The PRC’s infiltration efforts have already exposed vulnerabilities in Canada’s democratic and economic institutions; extending this vulnerability to the military risks crossing a line from which recovery may be difficult.
China’s infiltration of the Canadian government has been a slow-burning crisis, marked by missed opportunities to act decisively. The decision to allow foreigners into the CAF amplifies this threat, potentially handing adversarial nations a direct line into Canada’s defense apparatus. As a key player in North American security, Canada cannot afford to prioritize short-term fixes over long-term stability. Without a course correction, this policy may not only undermine Canada’s sovereignty but also destabilize the continent’s defenses, inviting exploitation by those who have already shown their intent to wield influence from within.
